Under
the present sales tax system, the distortion caused by the
levy of 4% CST on inputs is neutralized by the denial of
input tax credits on locally acquired inputs to the extent
of 4%. The present local sales tax laws allow the
manufacturer to procure the inputs at a concessional rate
of 4% local sales tax or avail refund of tax in excess of
4% in the case of locally procured inputs. This system
partially addresses the distortion to the extent that the
choice between local and inter-state purchase of inputs is
neutralized, while leaving aside the issue of tax
cascading.
If
non-creditable CST on inputs co-exist with the proposed
VAT where credit of tax paid on inputs is fully available,
it would be a serious concern to the Indian industries.
This would cause steep rise in non-productive expenses of
the industries to ward off the economic distortions
created by the new system such as opening of new depots
all over India, increase in logistics and compliance cost,
geographical re-location of input and ancillary
manufacturers etc. eventually contributing to increased
cost of production and overhead expenses. This may raise
serious doubts regarding the credibility of VAT regime in
the minds of the stakeholders and may even cause the
failure of new VAT regime. Hence, if the complete economic
benefits of sales tax reforms are to be achieved, then the
CST has to be abolished.
The
abolition of CST does not mean that there will not be any
tax on inter-state sales. The proposed abolition is aimed
at zero-rating the input tax even under the inter-state
sales as it is proposed in the case of local inputs under
the VAT regime. Under the proposed system, the tax paid on
inter-state purchase would be available to the
manufacturer as input tax credit so that there will not be
any effect of cascading of tax in the cost of finished
goods or distortions in the choice between local and
inter-state purchases. Under the present system of CST it
may not be possible to achieve this objective as the
destination state will not agree to give the credit of
input tax collected by the state of origin unless the tax
collected by the origin state is passed on to the
destination state. Because of this reason, consuming
Indian states are opposed to giving credit of CST on
inputs to the manufacturer whereas the exporting states
are not willing to surrender their right to tax the
inter-state sale. We are now facing the challenge to
address the revenue concerns of both the parties.
Dr.
Satya Poddar, the eminent economist and international
expert on VAT, has made a few observations about the
revenue concern expressed by the sate during one of the
seminars sponsored by the World Bank. He had stated that
it is inappropriate to focus on the revenue impact of the
individual components of tax reform, which would
invariably contain many elements with offsetting revenue
effects. What matters is the net revenue impact of the
overall reform package. As illustrated in the NIPFP
report, it is feasible to design revenue neutral VAT based
on the destination principle. The loss in revenues due to
elimination of the CST can be more than offset by suitable
adjustments in the tax rates, broadening of the tax base,
and improvement in tax compliance. There could be a net
gain in revenues where a distortion-free tax system
induces higher investment and economic growth. The
retention of a cascading tax, even at a reduced rate,
would be a source of complexity in the tax system and
would not be conducive to improvement in tax compliance.
If so, the net revenue impact of such a tax could be
negative. That is, the apparent revenue collections from
the application of the tax could mask the revenue losses
resulting from the shrinking of the tax base through
behavioral changes. Finally, it is likely that both the
cascading of taxes and selective reduction in their burden
through industrial incentives would be found to be in
contravention of India’s obligations under multilateral
trade agreements. If so, the States may have little choice
but to give serious consideration to more neutral forms of
tax design.
Under
the above circumstances, if we have to think about an
effective system at national level to zero-rate the
inter-state sales, it should address the following
concerns of the government and the industry;
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The
system should be economically neutral which means that
the tax system should not distort the economic
behavior and market choices otherwise made by
consumers and producers.
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The
system should not undermine the fiscal autonomy of the
state in administration of tax and should not heavily
depend on inter-jurisdictional co-operation.
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The
system should foster uniformity in compliance
procedures for trade between and within the exporting
and consuming state.
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The
system should have low administrative and compliance
cost
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It
should address the issue of cross-boarder VAT leakage.
Keeping
the above features in mind and also taking into
consideration the complexity involved in the federal
structure of Indian Union, we suggest the following system
viz. CInter-State VAT (VATI-VAT), which in our opinion
would address the concern of the government and the
industry. Dr. Poddar and Eric Hutton, has proposed a
similar system during a presentation at the national tax
conference in Baltimore as also NIPFP, in its report on
reform of domestic trade taxes in India.
Inter-State
Value Added Tax (C VATI-VAT):
The
C VATI-VAT would essentially be a destination-based tax
system for inter-state trade, aimed at providing full
input tax credit to inter-state purchase of inputs and
re-sale goods. It will maintain an effective trail of
inter-state movements in the absence of boarder controls,
including branch transfers. It also would prevent the
cascading of taxes, re-establish the output tax-input tax
credit chain for inter-state transactions and thereby
strengthen the audit trail under VAT regime to check
evasion. It would motivate the buyer and the seller to
comply with the requirements as well as provide incentives
to both exporting and consuming state to monitor the
compliance independent of each other. It also provides new
avenues for revenue to the origin state even under the C
VAT I-VAT under VAT regime, without affecting the VAT
chain as also provide a trail of stock transfers to both
exporting and consuming state. C VATI-VAT would be
essentially an improved version of the P-VAT or CPT
suggested by Dr. Poddar and NIPFP. This system does not
impose an extra burden on the seller or the buyer, than it
exists today. The proposed C VATI-VAT would meet all the
above criteria of an effective VAT regime.
Pre-requisites
under C VATI-VAT :
Under
the proposed system all registered dealers will be
required to maintain a deposit account with the state
government through designated banks, similar to the
Personal Ledger Account maintained by the manufacturers
under CENVAT scheme. The dealer would deposit an ad-hoc
amount in the government treasury under a prescribed
challan and take a credit of the same in the PLA. The
present C form and F form procedures will be de-controlled
and converted into tax paying document-cum-proof of
export, which can be printed by the registered dealer,
with necessary controls and conditions, as applicable, as
in the case of CENVAT invoices. The C and F forms will be
entirely different than the existing C and F forms in its
concept and utility. The form " C" will be
issued only in case where the goods are procured for the
purpose of consumption as an industrial input or for
re-sale. The form "F" can be issued only for the
purpose of branch transfer goods, which in turn are to be
used for industrial consumption or for resale. The nos. of
the C and F forms will be controlled and the condition of
self-certification by the authorized persons will be
introduced to make the dealer accountable for proper
management of the system. These forms i.e. both
"C" and "F" will be in quadruplicate
as in the case of CENVAT invoices. A prescribed format
with particulars as mentioned below will be made mandatory
for the forms C and F;
a.
Name and address of the dealer / importer
b. Registration number
c. Date of the document
d. Description of the goods
e. Qty of goods transferred
f. Value of goods
g. Amount of C VATI-VATI-VAT debited to PLA
h. PLA debit entry number and date
i. Name / address and the registration number of the
consignor
How
C VATI-VAT works in inter-state sale transaction:
As
and when the registered dealer procures industrial inputs
or finished goods from other states, he will prepare form
"C" in advance with prescribed particulars and
then debit the PLA with the amount of tax as applicable.
The form "C" would bear the reference PLA debit
entry no. The purchasing dealer shall retain the original
of form "C" where as the duplicate, triplicate
and the quadruplicate shall be forwarded to the seller in
other state. On receipt of the form "C" in
triplicate, the selling dealer shall retain his copy (may
be quadruplicate), where as the duplicate and the
triplicate copies shall accompany the consignment as a
proof of payment and export. The sales tax administration
at the border may endorse the document and capture the
data so that a data base of such inter-state movement may
be created, which can be useful in tracking the
consignment.
Once
the goods are received by the buying dealer, he can claim
the credit of the tax paid by him in his VAT return and
set it off against his VAT liability. In no case the
buying dealer shall be allowed to credit the PLA account,
other than to rectify a clerical error.
However,
in the case of goods, which are not falling under the
category of industrial inputs, and re-sale goods, the
facility of form "C" or "F" will not
be available. The goods in other category may not affect
the VAT chain as most of these goods are procured for
final consumption or use and as such may not create any
cascading of taxes even in the origin state. Since, the
"net exporting states" are very much concerned
about the revenue loss that they may incur due to a
destination based inter-state sales tax system, we suggest
that such sales may continue to be taxed by the origin
states. This we hope would bring down their objection to a
destination based inter-state VAT system significantly.
How
C VATI-VAT works in branch transfer:
In
case of branch transfers, the receiving branch shall
prepare form "F" in advance with relevant
particulars and debit the PLA for the amount equivalent to
the tax payable in the case of a sale. The value of goods
being transferred may be the transfer price. The procedure
to be observed shall be the same as in the case of a sales
transaction. On receipt of the goods the recipient dealer
shall claim the credit of the tax paid through PLA, in the
VAT return and set that off against the VAT payable.
Such
system would provide a credible trail of the inter-state
movement of goods under a VAT regime. In a computerized
environment it may not be difficult to capture the data of
inter-state movement at the entry/exit point of each
state. This system also eliminates the requirement of an
entry tax under the VAT regime, which may create
additional burden on the dealers to comply with the
requirement.
The
only issue that may arise under this system may be in the
case of inter-state movement of goods other than the
category of sale or stock transfer. In our opinion, the
remedy to this may be the "waybill mechanism"
which is followed by West Bengal government in the case of
movement of goods by un-registered dealer. Under this
mechanism the sales tax authorities shall issue the
waybill to the consignee, who in turn shall forward it to
the consignor. Such waybill shall control all other
dispatches other than under forms "C/D" and tax
paid at origin state. Thus the states can control the
inter-state movement and effectively check evasion, while
pre-empting the cascading of taxes under VAT regime. The
concern of loss of revenue of the developed states, will
also get addressed to some extent.
Even
though the point of levy is shifted to consuming state,
the producing states would still earn higher revenue as
higher production would also lead to higher employment,
overall development and ultimately high consumption levels
in the same state. The higher consumption level would also
lead to higher revenue for such state coupled with an
effective mechanism to check evasion. In such scenario,
the choice of location for manufacture to great extent
would depend upon better infrastructure, low labor cost
and other non-tax incentives provided by the states. This
would also give an equal opportunity for all the states to
boost the production and thereby consumption levels which
should ultimately result in overall growth of all the
states and removal of the regional disparities.
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